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INTRODUCTION
Given the negative consequences of crime, it should come as no surprise
that states will endeavor to make their dominions less hospitable to potential
criminal actors. This predisposition, when played out on a national stage,
would appear ripe for a dynamic in which states will seek to "out-tough"
one another, leading to a spiral of detrimental competitiveness.
Doron Teichman, in an article recently appearing in these pages,' ad-
vances just such a view. Teichman posits that the decentralized structure of
America's federalist system provides states with "an incentive to increas-
ingly harshen" their crime control efforts,2 with the net result being
excessive penalties and inefficient over-expenditures in state crime control
efforts.' He reaches this conclusion by wedding two distinct literatures: ju-
risdictional competition, based on the seminal work of Charles Tiebout,4 and
* William Mitchell Research Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A.
1983, Wesleyan; M.A. 1986, S.U.N.Y.-Albany; J.D. 1991, University of Wisconsin. -Ed.
1. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MIcH. L. REV. 1831 (2005).
2. Id. at 1832.
3. Id. at 1861.
4. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
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crime displacement and spillover, a focus of theoretical criminology.5 Even
more provocative is Teichman's prescription for change. Running against a
heavy tide of commentary condemning increased federal involvement in
criminal justice, 6 Teichman urges that the federal government serve as a
"regulator" of the states so that they can "achieve uniformity '7 and thereby
avoid "inefficient harshening."'
Although not the first commentator to tie crime spillover effects to race-
to-the-bottom concerns,9 Teichman provides perhaps the most developed
treatment of the thesis to date. In the limited space available here, I will not
seek to dispute the theoretical verity of Teichman's jurisdictional competi-
tion model more generally and the largely anecdotal evidence he advances
in support. Rather, I wish to highlight two specific areas of criminal justice
policy where such competition is absent-sex offender registration and re-
cidivist enhancement laws-and discuss the effects of state-state
interconnection.
According to Teichman, the capacity of ex-offenders to move from one
state to another presents the risk that they will naturally seek out new resi-
dences with more lenient criminal justice policies, prompting states wishing
to discourage such emigration to adopt harsher policies than they otherwise
might. One possible cure for this race-to-the-bottom dynamic, Teichman
reasons, is to remove travel incentives by ensuring that the criminal justice
policies of emigrants' erstwhile state residences follow them into their new
states. Teichman notes that sex offender registration laws in several states
currently contain such features,' ° and he lauds such laws as a "sensible wayto prevent race to the bottom" problems with registration." In the following
5. See, e.g., CRIME DISPLACEMENT: THE OTHER SIDE OF PREVENTION (Robert P. McNa-
mara ed., 1994); CRIME SPILLOVER (Simon Hakim & George F. Rengert eds., 1981).
6. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 (1999); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief" The Federalization of Ameri-
can Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995).
7. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1867.
8. Id. at 1835.
9. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 167, 180 (1996) ("[E]ach individual state has a strong incentive to prevent local
crime, knowing that it could go elsewhere."), with Kevin R. Reitz, The Federal Role in Sentencing
Low and Policy, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL, & SOC. SCi. 116, 125 (1996) ("[Tihere is little indica-
tion that states seek to disadvantage one another through their systems of criminal punishment.").
See also Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 247, 302 n.223 (1997) (noting negative externalities created when not all states had enacted
sex offender community notification laws and urging a "nationally uniform notification require-
ment").
10. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1856-57.
11. Id. at 1873. Teichman also considers the proliferation of "three strikes" recidivist en-
hancement laws as proof of state desires to combat ex-offender migration but characterizes the laws
as strategies to "displac[e] crime," not "displac[e] criminals," as is the case with sex offender regis-
tration laws. Id. at 1847. Teichman, however, does not discuss how recidivist laws can, like their
registration counterparts, defer to out-of-state convictions in forum-state recidivist enhancement
determinations.
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pages, I contest Teichman's supposition that increased coordination among
states will mitigate the harshening he identifies and question the advisability
of his proposed federal remedy.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the nature and extent
of current state registration and recidivist enhancement laws that permit
criminal justice policies to "travel" with ex-offenders. Part II questions the
purported benefits Teichman sees in such laws, highlighting an array of
negative consequences that Teichman fails to acknowledge, including the
very harshening of criminal justice policies he seeks to avoid. Finally, in
light of these pitfalls, Part III challenges Teichman's broader normative pre-
scription for federal governmental intervention as an agent of positive
change.
I. INTERCONNECTION
While historically states had little regard for how their fellow sovereigns
handled criminal offenders, 2 in recent decades they have shown increasing
awareness of the criminal justice policies of their sister states. Today, this
recognition is evidenced in two central methods of social control: criminal
recidivist sentence enhancement laws and sex offender registration laws.
Both types of laws have been in effect in some form for decades 3 and have
evolved over time to accommodate ex-offenders, who, if free of parole- or
probation-related restrictions, 4 can and do freely change state residences.'5
States have achieved this accommodation by using prior out-of-state convic-
tions to trigger application of registration requirements and enhance prison
sentences for recidivists in the same manner as the offender's former state
residence (the "foreign" state), irrespective of how the conviction would affect
offenders in the new state residence (the "forum" state). These laws may be
aptly characterized as "external" in nature because they defer to the laws and
outcomes of foreign states. This contrasts with the "internal" approach, which
12. Writing in 1934, for instance, the Georgia Supreme Court evinced this disregard in de-
ciding to eschew, for purposes of sentencing consideration, a prior out-of-state conviction of an
offender: "The courts of Georgia do not take judicial cognizance of the laws of these foreign juris-
dictions, and therefore cannot attribute to our General Assembly an intention to give equal dignity to
proof of a conviction in another jurisdiction to that which properly inheres in those of our own state
..... Lowe v. State, 177 S.E. 240, 240 (Ga. 1934).
13. On the history of criminal recidivist laws, see Wayne A. Logan, Civil and Criminal Re-
cidivists: Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1609, 1618-24 (2005). On the
history of registration laws, see Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 147, 158-67 (2000) [hereinafter Logan, Federal Habeas].
14. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003) (distinguishing between ex-offenders under
community supervision and those not under supervision, noting that the latter "are free to move
where they wish and work as other citizens").
15. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) ("We have expressly identi-
fied this 'right to remove from one place to another according to inclination' as 'an attribute of
personal liberty' protected by the Constitution." (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274
(1900))).
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ignores the qualifying criteria of foreign law and focuses instead solely upon
whether the forum state's own criteria are satisfied. '
6
Today, the registration laws of sixteen U.S. jurisdictions use an external
approach.17 These states, in addition to specifying particular offenses war-
ranting registration, also require registration if the foreign state where the
conviction occurred required registration. This is so regardless of whether
the foreign predicate conviction would warrant registration in the forum.' 9
Moreover, in several other states the external approach is used with particu-
lar ex-offenders-for instance, temporary visitors as a result of educational
or work arrangements.20
As for recidivists, twenty-two jurisdictions employ an external approach
when making sentence enhancement decisions.2' Sentencing courts in these
states focus on whether the foreign conviction resulted in sufficient punish-
ment to trigger the forum's recidivist offender law-typically a one-year
term in prison, equating with felony status-not whether the underlying be-
havior was criminalized in the forum, or, if criminalized, would warrant
felony status and thus enhancement viability there. Under this regime, as
noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals, foreign predicates need only be "felo-
nies under the laws of the state where the conviction was entered.... [I]t
[is] immaterial . . . whether the convictions in other states were for crimes
that would also have been felonies under Idaho law, so long as they were
felonies where the offenses occurred. 22
In sum, considerable evidence now exists of states deferring to one an-
other's criminal justice outcomes, providing the opportunity for a natural
16. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 269-78, 284-88 (2005) (distinguishing respective
approaches to recidivist enhancement and sex offender registration laws).
17. Id. at 287. The remaining thirty-five jurisdictions use an internal approach. See, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(A) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (requiring registration only if foreign
conviction "would" trigger registration in Arizona).
18. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(A) (Supp. 2004) ("Any person ... who has been
convicted of... an offense for which the person was required to register in the state where the con-
viction or plea occurred, shall be required to register.").
19. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179D.410(19) (LexisNexis Supp. 2001) (deeming
registerable offense as one "of a sexual nature committed in another jurisdiction, whether or not the
offense would be an offense listed in this section, if the person ... has been required by the laws of
that jurisdiction to register"); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.597(l)(2)(c) (2003) (applying registration laws
to "a person required to register in another state for having committed a sex offense in that state
regardless of whether the crime would constitute a sex crime in this state").
20. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRoc. § 11-704(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2001) (applying
external approach to workers and students).
21. Logan, supra note 16, at 276. The remaining twenty-nine jurisdictions use an internal
approach. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084(l)(c), (e) (West 2005) (requiring that foreign con-
viction be "substantially similar in elements and penalties").
22. State v. Williams, 651 P.2d 569, 580 (Idaho 1982); see also Gunderson v. State, 925 P.2d
1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1996) ("The fact that the previous convictions were felonies in the rendering
states but may not have been felonies in Wyoming is immaterial. The convictions were still felony
convictions.").
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test of Teichman's contention that such interconnection holds promise to
neutralize interstate competition and remedy its undesirable effects. As the
next Part highlights, however, state interconnection has a broad array of
negative consequences that call into question its advisability, including, per-
haps most notably, the tendency to incorporate and thus expand the same
criminal justice excesses of concern to Teichman.
II. RAMIFICATIONS
To Teichman, the external approach holds substantial promise to curtail
the states' natural competitive instincts and the race-to-the-bottom conse-
quences they engender. By permitting registration eligibility to turn on both
legal criteria indigenous to the forum state and that of offenders' former
state residences, Teichman reasons, state laws will become more uniform,
thereby discouraging adoption of ever-harsher registration requirements.23
Moreover, according to Teichman, the external approach ultimately inures to
the benefit of criminal offenders "as a group since [it] will allow jurisdic-
tions to adopt more lenient registration requirements. 24 As discussed in this
Part, however, empirical support for Teichman's case is not in evidence.
A. Practical Effects
1. Replication and Augmentation
Despite Teichman's claim to the contrary, no evidence exists that the ex-
ternal approach lessens state penality, in either a quantitative or qualitative
sense. While the approach has efficiency benefits,25 it functions to com-
pound the aggregate scope of social control by supplementing forum state
eligibility criteria with that of other states. While Teichman might well be
correct in his belief that jurisdictions will not feel the need to legislate anew
"to 'keep up' with harsh conditions adopted by other states, 26 this is only
because the external approach reflexively permits foreign laws to be an-
nexed by forum states.
Because this aggregate increase is comprised of the normative positions
27of individual states, it has an ineluctable qualitative dimension as well.
23. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1873 ("Once a state adopts such a provision, it in effect re-
moves itself from the jurisdictional race and is free to adopt any registration policy that best reflects
its values, with no need to 'keep up' with harsh conditions adopted by other states.").
24. Id.
25. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138 (1996) (noting that uniform laws can reduce "inconsistency
costs").
26. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1873.
27. See People v. Parker, 359 N.E.2d 348, 350 (N.Y. 1976) ("[Clrimes committed in other
jurisdictions.., with differing social mores and standards of conduct take on added significance in
our highly mobile society.").
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State registration laws, for instance, sweep up an enormous variety of be-
haviors, a tendency that the external approach honors. For example,
Alabama targets public display of obscene bumper stickers; 2' Kansas, adul-
tery if one party is less than eighteen years of age; 29 South Dakota, bestiality
and indecent exposure; 3° South Carolina, peeping, voyeurism, buggery, and
indecent exposure;3' and Connecticut, consensual sex between minors.
3
2
Child pornography, short of its production, is also frequently targeted.33 Fur-
thermore, some states require registration for non-sexual offense
convictions-for example, involuntary manslaughter (Kansas)34 or homicide
and aggravated assault (Montana) 35-and do not limit registerable offenses
to felonies.36 Finally, at least twenty-eight states require juveniles to regis-
ter.37
In addition to absorbing the specified predicates of other states, the ex-
ternal approach gives effect to the broad generalized criteria often found in
state registration laws. Minnesota, for example, mandates registration upon
conviction of an array of enumerated felony offenses, yet also permits regis-
tration when a conviction "aris[es] out of the same set of circumstances" as
an enumerated offense. 3' As a result, so long as an enumerated offense is
charged and a conviction for some offense results (even a misdemeanor),
registration can be required by a court.3 9 Other states require registration
upon conviction for a nonenumerated offense when the underlying behavior
is "sexually motivated," committed with a "sexual purpose" or for "sexual• ,940
gratification," or constitutes a form of "sexual perversion. Ultimately, the
28. ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (Supp. 2005).
29. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(5)(A) (Supp. 2004).
30. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 22-22-30(11), (14) (2004).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430(C), (10), (12), (14) (Supp. 2004).
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-73a, 54-250(5), 54-251(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2005).
33. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 589.400(1.)(2) (West Supp. 2005) (possessing child pornog-
raphy); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 62.01(5)(B) (Vernon 2005) (same).
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(d)(5) (Supp. 2004).
35. MONT. CODEANN. § 46-23-502(9)(a) (2005).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.63. 100(6)(C)(ii) (2004) (requiring registration for specified
Class A misdemeanor convictions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15(2)(b) (Supp. 2005) (requiring
registration for specified misdemeanor convictions).
37. Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-
Offender Registration Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163, 177-78 (2003).
38. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 Subd. lb(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
39. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711,715-16 (Minn. 1999).
40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A- 11-200 (1994) (requiring registration for "generally any act
of sexual perversion involving a member of the same or the opposite sex"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-254(a) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring registration for "any felony the court finds was committed
for a sexual purpose"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(b)(14) (Supp. 2004) (requiring registration for
"sexually motivated" crimes); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.130, 9.94A.030(41)-(42) (West
2005) (requiring registration for crimes committed for the purpose of "sexual gratification").
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external approach allows these broad criteria, effectuated by individual for-
eign state trial courts, to infuse the registration standards of forum states.
Similar effects are seen with recidivist laws, as the convictions on which
they are based also turn on the diverse normative views of states.4' One sees
disagreement on such basic matters as whether behavior should be criminal-
42 43ized, the definitions of particular crimes, and the availability of
defenses." Moreover, even in areas of substantive agreement, enormous
variation exists in punishments prescribed.45 With the external approach,
these variations are reflexively incorporated into the recidivist enhancement
laws of forum states.
In sum, by replicating the normative preferences of individual states, the
external approach increases the reach of registration and recidivist en-
hancement laws in both quantitative and qualitative ways. These constituent
state preferences, of course, are part and parcel of the decentralized,
autonomous quality of federalism itself. As Lynn Baker has observed, "[t]he
freedom of sub-national political communities to choose their own visions
of the good society, like any other form of 'diversity,' predictably results in a
mixed bag of results. ' 6 The external approach, however, disavows this local
prerogative, and, by infusing forum state law with that of other states, per-
mits the "mixed"-typically crime-control-oriented decisions of such other
states-to have effect far beyond their borders.47
2. Fairness
This systemic effect, in turn, has fairness-related consequences for indi-
viduals. With respect to registration, for instance, if an individual moves
41. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168 (1952) ("[C]rimes in the United States are
what the laws of the individual States make them.").
42. See, e.g., Michael M. O'Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 836
(2004) (noting varied state views on criminalizing marijuana possession); Amy C. Radosevich,
Note, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking Measures Keeping Pace with Today's Stalker?, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 1371, 1380-90 (noting varied state views on criminalization of stalking).
43. See, e.g., Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Conse-
quences of "Aggravated Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1724-29 (1999) (discussing
variations in state definitions of statutory rape, assault and battery, petty theft, driving under the
influence, and obstruction of justice).
44. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 173-194 (1984 & Supp.
2005) (surveying state variations in excuse-related defenses).
45. As the Supreme Court has noted, "the classification of state crimes differs wildly among
the States." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 n. 14 (1984). For an overview of such differ-
ences, see NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 75-240 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 5th ed. 2005).
46. Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002).
47. According to Madison, federalism was created with such potentialities in mind, allowing
extreme laws to remain localized. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 52 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1991) ("The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States .... In the extent
and proper structure of the Union ... we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident
to republican government.").
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from South Carolina to one of the fifteen other states using an external ap-
proach, the Palmetto State's broad gamut of registerable offenses will come
48into play. Similar scenarios result if one moves from any number of other
states with unusual registration criteria.
Under such circumstances, the external approach results in two possible
kinds of unfairness. The first involves emigrants from states with narrower
registration eligibility criteria; they, unlike the emigrant from say South Caro-
lina, will not be subject to registration in the forum because it was not
required by the foreign state. The second arises when an indigenous offender
is not required to register when convicted of a particular offense yet an emi-
grant is so required, based upon the terms of the foreign registration law. In
both such situations, registration, with its direct ° and collateral burdens-
including possibly community notification, with its litany of negative conse-
quences'-is driven by the happenstance of where the foreign conviction
occurred, leading to unequal outcomes.
With respect to recidivist laws, foreign jurisdiction decisions can compel
that a conviction be counted, even when the conviction would not trigger re-
cidivist status in the forum. As a result, sentences are determined not on the
basis of the normative views of the forum, but rather pursuant to where the
prior out-of-state conviction occurred.5 2 Similarly, variations in the treatment
of juveniles and pleas of nolo contendere can lead to unequal treatment when
the forum defers to a foreign state's use of such dispositions, yet ignores them
vis-A-vis its indigenous offenders. 3
Finally, with both registration and recidivist laws, the external approach
permits the varied procedural rules and rights of states to have extraterritorial
significance. Variations relative to such basic matters as jury size and unanim-54 55
ity14 and application of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, as well as
48. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
50. See Logan, Federal Habeas, supra note 13, at 183-86 (noting, among other things, in-
person registration requirements and name-change prohibitions).
51. See id. (noting, among other things, the threat of vigilantism and difficulties finding
housing and employment).
52. See State v. Bush, 9 P.3d 219, 222 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting internal-not
external-approach in order "to ensure that defendants with equivalent prior convictions are
treated the same way regardless of whether those prior convictions were incurred in Washington
or elsewhere").
53. See, e.g., State v. Vizcaino-Roque, 800 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (making use of
prior Florida nolo-based conviction that would not be recognized in Missouri).
54. See Robert H. Miller, Comment, Six of One Is Not a Half Dozen of the Other: A Reex-
amination of Williams v. Florida and the Size of State Criminal Grand Juries, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
621, 629 (1998) (discussing the increasing use of petit juries comprised of fewer than twelve
jurors and experimentation with nonunanimous juries).
55. Compare State v. Duntz, 613 A.2d 224 (Conn. 1992) (rejecting "good faith" excep-
tion), with Crayton v. Commonwealth, 846 S.W.2d 684 (Ky. 1992) (embracing exception).
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more particularized state procedures,56 can influence criminal justice out-
comes, and hence differentially affect individual-level recidivist enhancement
and registration-eligibility decisions.
B. Doctrinal Implications
Beyond its practical effects, the external approach has significant doc-
trinal implications.
1. Democratic Representativeness
First, and perhaps foremost, the external approach undercuts the democ-
ratic representativeness of the criminal law. Contrary to Teichman's
assertion that the external approach frees a jurisdiction "to adopt any regis-
tration policy that best reflects its values,"" it actually negates such values.
By bootstrapping value judgments of other states, the approach flouts the
premise that state criminal laws reflect the normative views of the jurisdic-
tions enacting them," what the Anti-Federalists lauded as state
"individuality."
59
By creating a legal landscape in which it becomes difficult to ascribe
value judgments with geopolitical accuracy, the external approach also func-
tions to undermine governmental transparency and political accountability.6°
By deferring to the laws of other sovereigns, forum state officials become
free-riders: they avoid any possible negative political consequences that
might attend enactment of such laws in the first instance in the forum. 6' Forinstance, a state with an external approach registration law can effectively
56. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 285 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1991) (counting prior Nevada
conviction even though it was secured without the same procedural protections that California
would afford).
57. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1873.
58. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2003) ("[T]he 'clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.'"
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989))); State v. Langlands, 583 S.E.2d 18, 20 n.4
(Ga. 2003) (" 'A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal code.
When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in
the clearest possible terms its view of public policy.'" (quoting New Mexico v. Edmondson, 818
P.2d 855, 860 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991))).
59. See SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERAL-
iSM 239 (1993) (quoting Dr. Johnson of Connecticut who observed that the Anti-Federalists saw the
states as "so many political societies, each with its individuality" while the Federalists saw the states
as "districts of people composing one political Society").
60. Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183 (1992) (invalidating Congress's at-
tempt to commandeer New York to dispose of low-level radioactive waste within its borders, and
noting that when governmental responsibility is obscured "federalism is hardly being advanced").
61. However, the legerdemain ultimately has (nonpolitical) consequences: the financial
expenditures associated with effectuating registration-plus perhaps community notification-and
enhancing prison terms, which have costs that must be borne by the forum state alone. Moreover,
defendants faced with enhancement in the forum might well be less likely to plead guilty and may
instead pursue trials, which have their own associated costs.
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codify indecent exposure (South Dakota) or involuntary manslaughter (Kan-
sas) as convictions requiring registration, even though the state might be
politically wary of adopting the requirements via the formal legislative
62process. The external approach thus permits a kind of stealth legislation:
laws are applied by the forum without having been subject to the debate and
compromise common to the legislative process, depriving the public of an
63important occasion for norm identification and support. While it might be
the case that the imported value judgment parallels that of the forum, this is
not necessarily so, and the furtive quality of the approach undercuts the de-
mocratically approved discretion a formal law embodies. 64
The external approach thus forsakes what Professors Baker and Young
have called the "negative freedom" of federalism-the right of states to act
autonomously and independently, free of the constraining authority of other
65governmental units. Convictions secured pursuant to foreign laws are per-
mitted to serve more than a mere evidentiary function, that is, signaling a
prior unwillingness to obey the law. They are used to effectuate the criminal
justice system of the forum state, in the process gainsaying a central animat-
ing value of federalism.6
2. Pluralism and Competition
In a related sense, the external approach impairs the pluralism and com-
petition ideally fostered by autonomous state rule. By bootstrapping the
laws and outcomes of other states, the approach ultimately constricts the
range of normative choices available to individuals, diminishing what Alex-
ander Hamilton regarded as the salutary competition for the people's
67
affection. This competition, Hamilton reasoned, has particular resonance
with respect to the administration of justice, "the most powerful, most uni-
62. This also serves to provide political cover for judges and prosecutors, especially when
they must stand for reelection.
63. As Paul Robinson has noted, the legislative process provides "an occasion for public
debate that can help build norms, with the conclusion of the debate announced by legislative action,
or inaction." Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1867 (2000).
64. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 401,
404-05 (1958) (describing criminal laws as embodying the "formal and solemn pronouncement of
the moral condemnation of the community").
65. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 134 (2001); see also Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Feder-
alisms, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1, 52 (2004) ("[S]tate governments cannot provide fora for political
participation and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora.").
66. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 993-94 (1995) ("A decentralized
federal system is efficient; it permits criminal justice policy to be tailored to local conditions and
policy preferences, and it furthers political accountability.").
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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versal and most attractive source of popular ... attachment" because it is
"the immediate and visible guardian of life and property."
68
Because the external approach makes prior convictions indelible matters
of record, negatively affecting recidivism and registration decisions regard-
less of the eligibility criteria of other states, individuals with such records
naturally will be less inclined to move.69 This of course is a central objective
of proponents of the external approach-to increase the reach of social con-
trol and discourage ex-offenders from moving into their states. Nonetheless,
by in effect making laws more uniform, the external approach discourages
exit rights7 ° and limits freedom of movement, an accepted constitutional
good.7 Ex-offenders, in effect, atavistically become tribe-like members of
72the state in which their conviction occurred, contrary to the free movement
ideals of the nation's federalist republic.73
The approach also ultimately chills the experimentation that ideally re-
sults from democratic competition and diversity. Depending on one's
perspective, it might well be that a "courageous" state74 is one that elects not
to embrace a particular crime or sentence outcome in its registration law or
68. Id.
69. This presumes, of course-as does Teichman's rational-choice model-that ex-offenders
are aware of the provisions of the state to which they might move. Tiebout himself acknowledged
that his analytic model artificially presumed adequate legal knowledge of such comparative differ-
ences. Tiebout, supra note 4, at 419. Ex-offenders perhaps have greater incentive to self-educate
because their liberty is imperiled, yet despite the anecdotal evidence provided by Teichman, there is,
given the disadvantaged backgrounds of many ex-offenders, no reason to think that they actually
would be any better equipped to do so. Cf Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 420-21 (1990) (noting that mobility is constrained by "eco-
nomic and social factors that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones" and that
"investors of capital and owners of businesses, rather than residents, are the prime beneficiaries" of
relocation options).
70. See Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 25, at 140 ("[U]niform state laws tend to decrease
exit opportunities." (emphasis omitted)).
71. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 178-79 (1980) (asserting that the right to travel is im-
portant because it protects an individual's capacity to leave an "oppressive" community); Todd E.
Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEo. L.J. 481, 501 (2004) (asserting that individuals "suffer an
externality when any state adopts regulations that render it an undesirable place to reside").
72. As Seth Kreimer has noted, state-based identification is a relic of antebellum thought:
"At the time of the Civil War, Robert E. Lee resigned his federal commission, and renounced his
oath of allegiance because as a 'Virginian' he could not bear to honor that oath. It is hard today to
find a citizen of the United States who conceives of her primary identity as a 'Virginian' or a 'Penn-
sylvanian' ... " Seth F Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American
Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 984 (2003).
73. As Douglas Laycock has observed, "There are other ways to organize, but we did not
choose them. An American state is not like a nomadic tribe, with membership based on kinship....
The state may be created for the good of its people, but it is defined by its territory, and 'its people'
are defined by the territory in which they live." Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Ter-
ritorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 316-17
(1992); see also Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y 562, 609 (1860) ("The position that a citizen carries
with him, into every State into which he may go, the legal institutions of the one in which he was
born, cannot be supported.").
74. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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recidivist regime. However, the external approach, by reflexively incorporat-
ing another state's contrary view, makes the public policy efficacy of any
such decision more difficult to discern. 75 As a result, another foremost pos-ited benefit of federalism-experimentalism-is sacrificed.
3. Race to the Bottom
Finally, despite Teichman's advocacy of the external approach as a "sen-
sible way to prevent a race to the bottom,'76 the approach actually fosters
just such an outcome. This is because, as Teichman's thesis itself attests,
77
criminal justice matters are subject to uniquely potent political pressures.
No politician relishes the prospect of being cast as a coddler of criminals,
especially sex offenders"' and recidivists.' 9 In such a climate, the external
approach, whereby the harshly idiosyncratic views of states are exported,
can have particular resonance.8 For instance, before Lawrence v. Texas"
invalidated state laws criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy, the
external approach would compel recognition of such convictions for pur-
poses of registration.82 This reflexive incorporation of oppressive law,83 in
addition to replicating the initial injustice, could ultimately foster a familiar-
ity and comfort in forum states with the foreign value judgment, bringing
75. For instance, with registration laws, the external approach obscures whether it is sensible
to require registration of persons convicted of particular predicate offenses (for example, peeping)
because the control set is excluded.
76. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1873.
77. As William Stuntz has observed, "[iuf there is any sphere in which politicians have an
incentive simply to please the majority of voters, it's criminal law." William J. Stuntz, The Patho-
logical Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-30 (2001); see also Wayne A. Logan,
"Democratic Despotism" and Constitutional Constraint: An Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto
Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 468, 495 (2004) (surveying extensive
public choice commentary addressing political resistance to criminal offenders). Importantly, the
political impotence of criminal defendants is apt to be particularly pronounced among emigrant ex-
offenders, whose newcomer status makes them even less likely to succeed in influencing political
change.
78. See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REv. 319, 320-21 (2003) (noting the wave
of harsh laws targeting sex offenders rapidly enacted in the 1990s, including registration and com-
munity-notification provisions).
79. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001).
80. Importantly, by definition the external approach operates only in one direction: to sys-
tematically import laws of a harsher nature, despite the forum state's more permissive law (that is,
failing to count the behavior for registration or recidivist purposes).
81. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
82. For examples of state laws requiring registration for consensual sodomy convictions, see,
for instance, ALA. CODE § 13A-I 1-200 (1994); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8304(l)(a) (Cum. Supp.
2002); Miss. CODE ANN. § 45-33-21 (Lexis 2003).
83. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 ("[L]aws once thought necessary and proper [can] in fact
serve only to oppress.").
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political pressure to formally recognize the policy via the legislative process,
with the result being a proliferation of harshness.
C. Summary
The preceding discussion makes clear that even if one accepts
Teichman's thesis of jurisdictional competition and spillover effects, there is
reason to doubt that his proposed uniformity-based remedy will result in a
less draconian regime of social control. Indeed, the evidence suggests quite
the opposite. In addition, as discussed, laws compelling uniformity have a
broad array of negative practical and doctrinal consequences, which should
give pause to policymakers perhaps inclined to adopt Teichman's prescribed
course of action.
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS "CENTRAL PLANNER"
In addition to failing to recognize the serious problems posed by the ex-
ternal approach, Teichman's advocacy of federal involvement requires brief
discussion. As Teichman concedes, the U.S. government has a dismal track
record when it comes to criminal justice, very often manifesting an irra-
tional "'tough on crime' attitude" irrespective of legislative context.84 He
therefore attaches a major caveat at the end of his article, noting that if this
proclivity persists there may be "little to gain, and perhaps even much to
lose, from additional federal regulation."" This caveat, supported by a
wealth of available evidence, plainly risks undercutting Teichman's argu-
ment altogether. But even so, and even if one were to somehow reconcile the
obvious federalism concerns associated with having the federal government
determine state criminal justice policy, 86 reason exists to be dubious of fed-
eral efforts to make state law more uniform.
Consideration of the federal role vis-h-vis registration and community
notification laws highlights why this is so. According to Teichman, federal
involvement can alleviate the negative externalities created by state
competition by maintaining current federal law imposing minimum
817registration eligibility requirements. This is because, Teichman maintains,positive externalities are generated with enhanced registration requirements,88
84. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1874.
85. Id.
86. See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (stressing the preeminent
autonomous role of states in criminal justice matters).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A), (B) (2000). States must satisfy these minima if they
wish to remain eligible to receive federal law enforcement grants. See Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2042 (1994) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1407 1(g)(2)(A) (2000)); Megan's Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110
Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (1994)).
88. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1871 n.202. Such positive externalities come in the form of"a
comprehensive data set that can serve all states," which Teichman regards as especially true in the
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and states need federal minima to encourage them to be more ambitious
because registration information benefits the entire nation, and not just local
communities. s9 At the same time, Teichman asserts, the states lack no such
incentives to aggressively pursue community notification, which Teichman
suggests more significantly promotes sex offender interstate migration and
hence competitiveness.9 In light of these circumstances, state notification
efforts must be collared by adoption of a "unified federal framework that
has maximum standards."91
Again, there is reason to question the accuracy of the dynamic portrayed
by Teichman. As made clear above, states are not lacking in their ardor to
impose registration requirements, and, despite Teichman's contrary asser-
tion, registration serves primarily the state and local-not national-
community, thus naturally encouraging imposition of broad requirements.
This is especially so in light of the low cost of registration itself, compared
to notification, and the major "get tough" political benefits new registration
requirements have for state officials. As a result, assuming the propriety of a
federal role, maximum standards would appear just as needed with registra-
tion, which while not as personally burdensome as community notification,
has negative effects of its own."
Second, Teichman's backing of federal maxima for notification, while
permitting continued federal minima for registration, raises concern for a
related practical reason. Because registration itself is always prerequisite to
notification, registration criteria inevitably affect notification outcomes. This
is especially so in the many states that, rather than undertaking individual-
ized risk determinations of all registrants before subjecting them to
notification, instead automatically subject all registrants to notification,94
an approach condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court.9 The two sanctions are
thus inextricably tied, a reality further complicated with increasing use of
the external approach: the expansive registration criteria of states, permitted
by the lack of federal maxima, can drive notification, leading to the same
inflationary concern troubling Teichman.
Third, political process concerns call into question the advisability of
federally imposed maximum community notification criteria. Such criteria
wake of new federal legislation requiring the creation of a federal sex offender database. Id. (citing
42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2000)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1871.
91. Id. (emphasis omitted).
92. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468 (S.D.N.Y 1998) ("[R]egistration ...
place[s] a 'tangible burden' on [individuals] potentially for the rest of their lives."); Doe v. Dep't of
Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409 (Alaska 2004) (discussing burdens associated with registration alone).
93. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.052(2) (West 2003); N.J. Srxr. ANN. § 2C:7-8d(l)
(West 2005); N.Y CORRECT. LAW § 168-f (McKinney 2003).
94. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-21 (1995); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.65.087, 12.63.010 (2004);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4904 (Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-102, 40-39-103 (2003).
95. See Conn. Dep't Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003).
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would, if Teichman's competitiveness model holds true, provide states posi-
tive incentives to expand their laws. Politicians invariably feel pressure to
achieve any anticrime goals put before them, whatever the countervailing
indigenous sentiment toward lenience that might exist. This natural impulse,
in turn, is significantly increased in instances when the federal government
exercises its conditional spending power authority, as seen with registration
96
and community notification laws themselves. The result, again: the veryharshening of the criminal justice system that Teichman seeks to avoid.97
CONCLUSION
Doron Teichman has provided an engaging, thought-provoking discus-
sion of the competition-based difficulties potentially presented by America's
decentralized system of criminal justice and the largely ignored matter of
the benefits possibly attending public cooperation in crime control.98 To
Teichman, the atomized nature of the system carries great risk: states will
create negative externalities in their natural competitive zeal to repel and
expel criminal offenders.99 Because this self-destructive dynamic ultimately
stems from a collective action problem, Teichman reasons, the situation is
ripe for mediation and cooperation. Teichman's proposed remedy lies in
greater interstate reliance and uniformity in criminal justice policies, as well
as possible intervention by the federal government as a rational "central
planner."
Here, I have attempted to highlight the empirical reality that, despite the
compelling quality of Teichman's theoretical model, increased state coop-
eration presents an array of practical and doctrinal difficulties. Furthermore,
Teichman's suggested federal role, for reasons he does acknowledge, as well
as for several others he does not, holds little realistic promise for optimism.
For better or worse, America's system of decentralized governance, in-
cluding its crime control efforts, permits states significant latitude to pursue
96. See, e.g., State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 940 (Haw. 2003) (citing legislative statements indi-
cating that changes to Hawaii's registration and notification law were prompted by concern that the
state would forfeit federal funding).
97. For instance, given the Supreme Court's position that individualized risk determinations
need not occur before undertaking notification, see Conn. Dep't Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), it is
highly unlikely that Congress would impose such a requirement despite the sound practical and
policy reasons favoring individualization. See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex
Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593, 636-37 (2000).
98. See Simon Hakim & George F. Rengert, Introduction, in CRIME SPILLOVER, supra note
5, at 1, 13 ("[W]e know little about the relative merits of public cooperation versus competition in
crime control."); Reitz, supra note 9, at 120 ("[L]ittle thought has been given to appropriate inter-
governmental roles [in sanctioning offenders].").
99. With criminal justice, there is, in effect, no "Delaware"-no individual state calls the
shots with respect to crime control policies, creating a climate in which competition (to the extent it
exists) is perhaps keener than in the corporate law realm, where Delaware's preeminence has been
theorized to undercut competition. For a discussion of this point in the context of real property law,
see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72, 93-94
(2005).
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their independent interests. To be sure, this very independence can foster
inefficiencies and less than optimal social outcomes. A "single courageous
State"' ° can experiment, and this experiment, if ill-advised and copied by
others, can aggregate into increasingly suboptimal outcomes.' °t However, as
the discussion here makes clear, Teichman's proposed cures-fusing state
laws or allowing Congress to micromanage states-are likely worse than the
disease.
100. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
101. See G. Lana Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and Scientific
Management, 31 PUBLIJS: J. FEDERALISM 37, 40-41 (2001) (discussing the need to limit experi-
ments undertaken by states).
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